Lower deployment cost, lower hardware cost — and a lower-commitment way in. The ask behind the 25 non-binding letters of intent.

A robotic platform for the food & beverage industry.
Built once. Running in three stores today.
Point-of-sale totals for all three stores, by calendar quarter. Q1 2026 came in 114% above Q1 2025. Q2 2026 — the last quarter that has finished — came in 137% above Q2 2025.
Source: Yummy Future analytics, POS orders for all three stores, calendar quarters (America/Chicago), data through 2026-09-02. The series starts with the first store’s first order on Sep 4 2023, so the opening bar covers Sep 4–30 only. Store count grows across the window: one store until the second Champaign shop opened Nov 2024, three since Palo Alto opened Oct 2025. Q1 2026 ($262,534) matches fact-check row WF-01. The hatched bar covers Jul 1 – Sep 2 only; its +176% is measured against those same days in 2025 ($57,729 → $159,329), not against a full quarter. Bars are POS gross sales at the register, not audited revenue, which is reported on a different basis. No figure on this slide is annualized or projected.
In the Advanced Digital Projects Lab, University of Illinois.
Illinois Cozad New Venture Challenge, Amazon Alexa Prize, then Demo Day with the S19 batch.
170 University Ave, California.
As Matcha House.
Two cities. Three locations.
10 yrs robotics. B.S. EE / M.S. ECE, UIUC. Prior: Google hardware (2018). Built the unit.
7 yrs engineering & operations. M.Eng., UIUC Grainger College of Engineering. Runs the operation every day.
M.S., UC Berkeley. RoboCon world champion. Robotics build.
Around them: the store crews who open the doors, work the bar, and tell us what broke.
Founded September 2018 at the University of Illinois; joined Y Combinator in 2019.
Seed-stage backer
Early backer
Transformative tech fund
Y Combinator cofounder · OpenAI founding member
Factories spent forty years engineering the repetition out of the work. The counter never got the same tools.
Published industry benchmarks — they describe the category, not Yummy Future's own results. IFR World Robotics 2025 (2024 data), manufacturing. Food service: no published density benchmark exists — that bar is our own estimate, not a cited figure.
Black Box Intelligence (TDn2K People Report) · DailyPay
National Restaurant Association · BLS food services (NAICS 72251)
A specialty barista pulls the same shot all shift long — and is also the one who knows the regulars, picks the music, and runs the store. Most of the shift goes to the half of the job that needs none of that.
No one can stand behind the bar all day. So the cup either never sells — or it sells from a pot brewed an hour ago.
In specialty coffee, a $7K day at one store takes a full crew and a line out the door. Every extra cup on the counter costs another pair of hands behind the bar.
A barista's shift is really two jobs: the same motion over and over, and the reason people come back. We built the unit to take the first one.
Pulling shots · steaming milk · whisking matcha.
The same motion, every shift, every store.
Welcome · menu · regulars · brand.
The work humans do best.
Part-time jobs across three stores — the unit took the repetitive half of the shift, not the job. Same craft, better job, better business.
MAX is a complete robotic drink platform, not just a robot arm. It includes the arm, the software that runs it, payment, inventory, and supply chain. Everything an operator needs to run a drink business, in one system, with no robotics expertise required.
The system pours coffee, matcha, and cocktails today, with tea designed into the same arm. Up to 80 drinks an hour, consistently, with no shifts and no turnover. It’s live in three stores today, the same system in all three.
Now we’re expanding. We’re partnering with brands to put MAX in more places, and engineering a more compact, higher-tech version that fits any venue and is even easier to run.
Forward statements describe plans, not guarantees. Actual outcomes may differ. See Form C and risk factors.
All three are open to the public. The figure above is read off the monthly point-of-sale record — not projected.
of revenue goes to labor across US food service.
barista turnover a year — the whole bar, replaced, and then some.
Gross profit grew in dollars. Gross margin was 63% in 2024 and it fell in 2025 as the third store opened — growth in dollars, not in percentage. We have no audited store-level or net profit margin, so we do not state one, and we do not state a payback period.
Every figure above is drawn from our company fact base and is marked there as cleared to publish. Labor share and turnover are third-party benchmarks, not our own accounts. Cups per hour are our own figures: about 20 for a person is from our deck with no third-party source, and up to 80 is a peak at full configuration that has not been independently measured. Revenue and gross profit are the FY2024 and FY2025 audited consolidated statements. Gross margin fell between those years; nothing on this page is a store-level result, an allocation, an annualisation or a projection. See our Form C and risk factors.
@yfmatchahouse on Instagram · by August 12, 2026
New brand, new recipes, new visuals — same unit, same software. Concept to live: under a week.
The average ticket at our Champaign stores went from $6.16 in 2023 to $8.57 in 2026 — 39% more per order, on the same street. Orders a month nearly doubled over the same window: nobody walked away when the price went up.
Both Champaign stores, POS orders incl. sales tax. 2023 starts in September.
Palo Alto ran straight through the summer and winter breaks that empty out Champaign — deployed, monitored, and operated remotely, 2,100 miles from our home base. 10,000+ hours of bug-free operation. No campus, no semesters, no student base. The system didn’t miss a beat.
A hotel lobby is dead at 6am and three-deep at 8:45 — no shift pattern fits both. A unit stands through both, and the last cup of the day costs what the first one did.
Before sunrise
The 8:45 rush
Between meetings
18 hours a day
Market sizing only. Venue counts and category market sizes are published industry statistics, cited per source. Yummy Future's share of any of these markets is not projected here. Not committed revenue. See Form C for full discussion.
Three locations live — Palo Alto, 170 University Ave; Champaign, 401 & 609 E Green St.
Plan to bring the first franchise locations online and start leasing units to operators.
Plan for franchise count to accelerate as network density compounds. The 25 LOIs are where it starts.
Champaign switched concept in under one week — same robotic unit, same software, same service model.
We plan to stand up the operating, legal and support infrastructure operators need to run the units.
Same hardware in every store, so the next city is a new site — not a new product.
All of it is non-binding interest. Forward-looking — actual pace depends on operator readiness, capital, and execution. Today no Yummy Future unit is operated by a third party and no franchise or licensing revenue has been earned.
Every opening is still a construction project — site survey, build-out, plumbing and power, then install the unit. Three stores are live on this model. But cost and timeline sit on the site, and only spaces you’re allowed to renovate qualify.
Not a full store — the essence of store operations, the core platform in a small form factor that drops into a venue’s existing setup. Built and tested on our line, delivered ready to place, connected to the site’s existing power and water.
Smaller footprint, lower build cost, faster deployment.
Operators lease the module, run the location, and share revenue with us. As modules compound across both channels, we focus upstream on product iteration and core technology.
Lower deployment cost, lower hardware cost — and a lower-commitment way in. The ask behind the 25 non-binding letters of intent.
Every venue where a construction project was never an option — the four on the market page. The module works with their existing setups instead of a full build‑out.
The platform inside — the same one running in three live stores today. Franchise stays. Our focus stays on product and core technology.
Concept schematic — not a product rendering, not to scale. Forward statements describe plans, not guarantees. Actual outcomes may differ. The module is a plan, not a shipping product; no cost, timing, or specification figures are stated here. Letters of intent are non-binding. See Form C and risk factors.
In this category the failure is rarely the engineering. It is a unit that gets built, sold into a venue, and then sits idle — because nobody tested whether people would pay for the drink.
Demand is the last question asked.
Capital goes in first, over years.
The buyer carries the demand risk.
The first real customer arrives here.
By then the capital is spent, and the unit sits idle.
Demand is the first question answered, with our own money.
On our own books, not a buyer's.
A receipt, not a forecast.
A second concept in the same town; a second market on the other coast.
Operators come to a store that already earns.
Every figure behind that track is already in this deck — what the counters took, a second concept that cost the first no sales, a second market on the other coast, and operators who came only after the stores worked.
Non-binding interest is not an order or a commitment. Forward statements describe plans, not guarantees. Figures referred to are reported in full on earlier pages. See Form C and risk factors.
We've shown what it can do. We're just starting. Come build the rest with us.
Early bird applies to the first $100K invested. Investor perks at $1K, $5K, $10K, $25K.
See Form C and risk factors before investing. Forward statements describe plans, not guarantees.
Backup photography for Q&A — not part of the main narrative. Every frame here was taken in a store we operate; none of it is licensed stock.
Financial figures live on the traction and trajectory pages. Nothing on this page is a claim.